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1 Introduction 
It is by now almost accepted as a stylised fact that foreign multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) perform better than domestic firms for a number of indicators.  In particular, recent 
analyses of micro level data commonly find that MNEs pay higher wages than their 
domestic counterparts.
1  This is an important finding, as studying the implications of 
multinationals on domestic workers is arguably of great consequence to the economy, not 
least from a policy maker’s perspective.
2   
However, even when controlling for observable and time invariant unobservable 
characteristics (e.g., in a fixed effects estimation), there remains a fundamental problem in 
identifying the performance difference that is attributable to multinationality per se.  As 
Tybout (2000), for example, points out, multinationals may be attracted to more technology 
intensive industries, which are also more productive and pay higher wages.  Hence, there 
would be an endogeneity problem in the regressions and the wage differential between 
foreign and domestic firms would be difficult to interpret.  The inclusion of some industry 
and firm characteristics might go some way towards reducing this bias, though the 
inclusion of all possible relevant control variables is a difficult if not impossible task.   
In this paper we try to overcome this problem by analyzing the effects of an 
acquisition of a domestic establishment by a foreign multinational enterprise on wages for 
skilled and unskilled workers using establishment level data for the UK.  Assuming that an 
acquisition does not change any of the main characteristics of the takeover target (at least in 
the short run) a possible effect of the foreign acquisition on wages in the domestic target 
can be attributed to the change in ownership from domestic to foreign.  We use a 
                                                           
1 See, for example, Feliciano and Lipsey (2006) for the US, Girma, Greenaway and Wakelin (2001) for the 
UK and Lipsey and Sjöholm (2004) for Indonesia.  These papers control for some observable firm and 
industry characteristics. 
2 Of course, productivity effects of multinationals are also important to the economy.  These have been the 
subject of many recent studies, see, for example, Girma and Görg (2006) and Doms and Jensen (1998).    2
difference-in-differences propensity score matching approach to identify the average effect 
of foreign acquisitions (the treatment) on wages in the domestic target.     
There have been a couple of earlier empirical studies which are related to our paper.  
Lipsey and Sjöholm (2002) study the wage premium following a foreign acquisition using 
plant level data for Indonesia.  They relate the average wage in a plant to a number of 
ownership and plant characteristics and conclude that foreign takeovers are associated with 
higher wages even when controlling for firm and industry characteristics.  However, this 
can only be interpreted as the causal effect of ownership change on wages if the foreign 
takeover is exogenous to unobserved shocks to plant level average wages.  While the 
authors control for unobserved time invariant plant level effects in the model, exogeneity is 
still a strong assumption as there are a number of time varying facts that are plausibly 
correlated with average wages.   
Conyon et al. (2002) study the effect of foreign acquisitions on wages in the 
domestic target using company level data for UK manufacturing.  They find that foreign 
acquired firms pay 3.4 percent higher wages than non-acquired firms, controlling for firm 
size as well as fixed firm and industry specific effects.
3  They acknowledge the potential 
endogeneity of the acquisition decision and identify the acquisition wage effect based on a 
simple instrumental variable estimation, using the probability of acquisition (conditional 
on, inter alia, lagged wages) as an instrument.  This approach is only valid under the 
(arguably strong) assumption that the probability is uncorrelated with contemporaneous 
wages.  It should also be noted that their data identify acquisitions of whole companies 
rather than plants.  Furthermore, acquisitions cannot be observed directly in the data, but 
only indirectly as firms that change their ownership status from being “independent” to 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
Another related, yet different, research question is whether multinationals increase the demand for skilled 
labour. See, for example, Slaughter (2000) and Figini and Görg (1999) for such studies. 
3 However, this differential disappears when labour productivity is added as a regressor, indicating that the 
wage difference can be wholly attributed to productivity differences between foreign and domestic firms.   3
being a subsidiary of another firm.  This, thus, excludes possible acquisitions of companies 
or plants that were subsidiaries of other enterprises prior to takeover.   
We extend and improve upon these earlier papers in a number of ways.  First, we 
use a non-parametric difference-in-differences propensity score matching approach to be 
able to identify the causal effect of the takeover on wages.
4  Matching estimators, in 
particular combined with the difference-in-differences technique, are arguably more 
appropriate compared to a simple instrumental variable approach as no strong exclusion 
restrictions are needed (e.g., Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000).  Such an estimation approach 
is novel for the analysis of a foreign wage premium.  In line with the recent statistical 
literature, we are also careful to assess the credibility of the matching procedure using a 
number of balancing tests.   
Secondly, in contrast to earlier studies we allow for different effects of acquisitions 
by firms from different home countries, in particular from the US and the EU.  As we 
discuss below, these distinctions bring up interesting differences in results for the two 
groups of workers and different firm nationalities.  Thirdly, while Conyon et al. (2002) look 
at average wages per firm, our data set allows us to distinguish the effect of an acquisition 
on wages for skilled and unskilled workers separately, similar to Lipsey and Sjöholm 
(2002).  Fourthly, our data set is at the establishment (mostly plant) level and allows us to 
identify takeovers directly in the raw data (in contrast to Conyon et al., 2002).   
In the empirical analysis below we do find that foreign acquisitions lead to changes 
in domestic wages for skilled and unskilled workers, although there is substantial 
heterogeneity in the magnitude of the effects depending on skill group of workers and 
                                                           
4 Subsequent to our analysis, Martins (2004) conducted a study using a propensity score matching approach to 
identify the link between foreign acquisition and wages.  He uses linked firm-employee data for Portuguese 
manufacturing firms over the period 1991 to 1999.  He finds negative effects of acquisitions on wage growth, 
while simple OLS estimations show a positive relationship between foreign ownership and wages.  Our 
estimation approach may be considered more appropriate as we implement a combined difference-in-
differences propensity score matching estimator. Also in contrast to Martins (2004) we are careful to explore 
the appropriateness of the matching procedures using a number of balancing tests.     4
nationality of the acquirer.  The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  In Section 
2 we briefly outline the background for why we would expect an effect of foreign 
acquisition on wages.  Section 3 describes the empirical methodology while Section 4 
introduces the data set.  Section 5 presents some balancing tests performed in order to 
ensure the reliability of the matching approach.  Section 6 describes the results of the 
matching estimations and Section 7 concludes.  
 
2 Background  
Why would affiliates be expected to pay higher wages after having been acquired by 
a foreign-owned multinational?  An explanation that is linked quite closely to the industrial 
organization theory of multinationals starts from the assumption that multinationals have 
access to some form of firm specific asset (Markusen, 2002).  This can be a superior 
production technique, know-how, or management strategy, and has at least some of the 
characteristics of a public good and enables the firm to locate profitably abroad.  This firm 
specific asset implies that multinationals use a “superior” level of technology and, hence, 
explains why they are usually expected to have higher levels of productivity compared to 
purely domestic firms.   
If this implies that the foreign multinational has higher marginal productivity of 
homogeneous labour then, in a competitive labour market, it would be advantageous for the 
firm to expand output rather than increase wages.  However, if one assumes that the 
efficient use of the firm specific asset requires “better” (in the sense of more productive) 
workers, then one may observe higher wages after the transfer of the firm specific asset to 
the takeover target.  Another explanation based on the firm specific asset idea which can be 
used to justify why multinationals pay higher wages to identical workers is that MNEs may 
want to minimize the amount of labour turnover in order to prevent the leakage of the firm   5
specific asset.  In order to do so they may pay higher wages to provide an incentive for 
workers not to quit.
5 
Apart from the possession and transfer of a firm specific asset, is there any reason to 
expect any additional effects of a foreign takeover on wages?  The change in ownership 
may bring with it a change in industrial relations practices which may have impacts on the 
wage structure.  Budd et al. (2005) argue and provide evidence that multinationals share 
rents with workers across borders, i.e., the wage level in the foreign affiliate is linked to 
profits in the parent company.  The implementation of these rent sharing arrangements may 
increase wages after the ownership change.  Another industrial relations argument has been 
made by Carmichael (1992) who argues that US multinationals in the UK paid higher 
wages than domestic firms in order to “bribe” workers to avoid industrial relations disputes.  
Furthermore, Conyon et al. (2002) point out that multinationals, in particular from Japan, 
may actually bring with them successful work practices, industrial relations arrangements 
etc. which will be implemented in their foreign subsidiaries.  In order to implement these 
new arrangements “peacefully” workers may be compensated with higher wages. 
An interesting question to ask is whether takeovers by multinationals from different 
home countries should be expected to have different effects on post-acquisition wages.  We 
may expect this for at least two reasons.  First, in terms of technology as a firm specific 
asset, it is widely accepted that the US is the technological leader which gives the average 
US multinational a technological leadership vis-à-vis comparable UK companies (Crisuolo 
and Martin, 2004).  Foreign firms from other EU countries may, however, have less of such 
a technological advantage compared with the average UK firm as they may be expected to 
                                                           
5 Lipsey (2004) provides a number of other reasons for why multinationals pay higher wages, in particular 
that workers may have an inherent preference to work for domestic firms and therefore need to be 
compensated, or that multinationals due to lack of knowledge of the local labour markets must pay higher 
wages to attract good workers.  However, these reasons do not seem applicable for explaining relative short 
term changes in wages after a foreign acquisition of a domestic firm.    6
have access to a fairly similar level of technology.
6  Hence a wage premium may be 
expected to be higher for affiliates taken over by US multinationals than by others.   
On the other hand, considering industrial relations, we may expect less of a 
difference between US and UK firms, who have similar “Anglo-Saxon” industrial relations 
regimes, while firms from other continental EU countries (such as Germany and France) 
have very different labour market institutions (see, for example, Boeri et al., 2001).  Hence, 
we may expect different effects also from that point of view between EU and US firms.   
 
3 Empirical methodology  
The aim of the paper is to analyse whether there is a causal effect from an 
acquisition of a domestic establishment by a foreign owner on wages in the domestic target.  
In other words, the empirical modelling problem is the evaluation of the causal effect of 
foreign acquisition on y, where y represents skilled or unskilled wages in the target 
establishment.  
Let  { } 1 , 0 ∈ it ACQ  be an indicator of whether establishment i  is acquired by a 
foreign MNE at time period t, and let 
1
s it y +  be wage at time t+s,  0 ≥ s , following 
acquisition.  Also denote 
0
s it y +  as the wage of the plant if it had not been acquired.  The 
causal effect of foreign ownership for firm i at time period t + s is then defined as: 
                                     
0 1
s it s it y y + + −  .                                                                        (1) 
The fundamental problem of causal inference is that the quantity 
0
s it y +  is 
unobservable for plants that have been acquired (i.e., for which we observe 
1
s it y + ).  Thus the 
analysis can be viewed as confronting a missing-data problem.  Following the 
                                                           
6 This should not distract, however, from the general idea that foreign firms must have a technological 
advantage in order to operate successfully abroad.     7
microeconometric evaluation literature (e.g. Heckman et al, 1997, Dehejia and Wahba, 
2002), we define the average effect of acquisition on the acquired firms as 
          { } { } { } 1 | 1 | 1 |
0 1 0 1 = − = = = − + + + + it s t it s t it s t s t ACQ y E ACQ y E ACQ y y E              (2) 
where causal inference relies on the construction of the counterfactual for the last term in 
equation (2), which is the outcome the acquired establishments would have experienced, on 
average, had they not been acquired.  This is estimated by the average wage of the plants 
that remained in domestic hands,  { } 0 |
0 = + it s it ACQ y E . 
This is, of course, only a valid approximation if there are no contemporaneous 
effects that are correlated with ACQ and that are not controlled for.  If that is not the case 
then the empirical analysis is plagued with endogeneity and simultaneity bias.  Hence, an 
important feature in the accurate construction of the counterfactual is the selection of a 
valid control group.  The approach we take is to employ matching techniques.  The purpose 
of matching is to pair each foreign acquired plant with a domestic establishment that has 
not undergone any ownership change on the basis of some observable variables, in such a 
way that the domestic establishments’ wage dynamics can be studied to generate the 
counterfactual for the newly foreign owned plants.
7  This type of matching procedure is 
preferable to randomly or indiscriminately choosing the comparison group, because it is 
less likely to induce estimation bias by picking firms with markedly different 
characteristics.  
Since matching involves comparing acquired and non-acquired establishments 
across a number of observable pre-acquisition characteristics (e.g., productivity, size, 
industry characteristics), it is desirable to perform the matching on the basis of a single 
index that captures all the information from those variables.  We adopt the method of 
                                                           
7 Since the purpose of this paper is to compare foreign acquired with domestic plants any plant that remains in 
domestic hands is a valid control.  This could also include domestic establishments that were taken over by   8
propensity score matching due to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), which suggests the use of 
the probability of receiving treatment (foreign acquisition in the present context) 
conditional on those characteristics, to reduce the dimensionality problem.  Accordingly, 
we first identify the probability (or propensity score) of being acquired using a probit 
model  
) ( ) 1 ( 1 − = = it it X F ACQ P                (3) 
where X is a vector of covariates observed in the time period before acquisition.  This 
vector consists of the pre-acquisition levels of establishment size (proxied here by capital 
stock), productivity, skilled and unskilled wages, as well as a dummy variable indicating 
whether or not a plant is located in an assisted area in the UK and a full set of time 
dummies.  
The choice of covariates is influenced by the empirical literature on foreign 
acquisitions (e.g. Conyon et al, 2002, Harris and Robinson, 2002).  Existing evidence 
suggests that establishment size is an important determinant for acquisitions.  Also, high 
productivity plants are commonly found to be more likely to be taken over, indicating that 
foreign firms may be “cherry picking” the best performing establishments.  Wages by skill 
groups prior to acquisition are included to address the argument that foreign firms may take 
over high or low wage establishments (see Lipsey and Sjöholm, 2002).  
Now let  i p  denote the predicted probability of being acquired for plant i in the 
group of acquired plants (say group A) and let  j p  denote the predicted probability of being 
acquired for plant j in the control group (say group C).  A standard matching estimator of 
the causal effect of foreign acquisition can be written as  









i j i i y p p g y ) , ( µ                                                           (4) 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
other domestic owners, or that are likely to be targets for domestic takeovers.  In our version of the ARD we   9
where g(.) is a function assigning the weights to be placed on the comparison firm j 
while constructing the counterfactual for acquired firm i.  The different matching estimators 
proposed in the literature (such as nearest neighbour matching and kernel matching 
estimators) differ from each other in the choice of the weighting function they employ. For 
example, the Gaussian kernel function used in this paper is defined as follows: 
































∝ K the Gaussian normal function, h is is the bandwidth parameter 
and C denote the set of non-acquired plants.  
Since we have longitudinal data, we do not employ this matching estimator in levels 
but rather use a difference-in-differences (DID) matching estimator on the matched plants 
instead.  This is motivated by recent studies which argue that standard matching estimators 
are usually unsatisfactory (e.g., due to the strong assumption of “selection on observables”), 
but in combination with difference-in-differences methodology can have the potential to 
“...improve the quality of non-experimental evaluation results significantly” (Blundell and 
Costa Dias, 2000, p. 438).  The difference-in-differences matching estimator has the 
additional advantage of eliminating unobserved time-invariant differences in wages 
between acquired and non-acquired firms that standard matching estimators fail to 
eliminate (Smith and Todd, 2005a).
8 
The DID matching estimator is defined as follows.  Let  y ∆   be the difference 
between the average wage before and after the change of ownership.  Then following 
Heckman et al (1997) the estimator can be expressed as: 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
are not able to adequately observe domestic acquisitions.     10







∆ − ∆ =
A iC j
i j i i y p p g y ) , ( δ .                                                      (6) 
We employ variants of this DID matching estimator for the empirical analysis below.
9   
 
4 Description of the data  
We use data from the Annual Respondents Database (ARD), which is provided by 
the Office for National Statistics (ONS) in the UK under controlled conditions.  The dataset 
consists of individual establishments' records underlying the Annual Census of Production 
and the data used cover the period 1980 to 1994.  As Barnes and Martin (2002) provide a 
useful introduction to the data set, we only include a brief discussion of some of its features 
relevant to the present work.   
In the period covered by our data, the ARD consists of two files.  What is known as 
the ‘selected file’, contains detailed information on a sample of establishments that are sent 
inquiry forms.  The second file comprises the ‘non-selected’ (non-sampled) establishments 
and only basic information such as employment, location, industry grouping and foreign 
ownership status is recorded.  During our study period, some 14,000-19,000 establishments 
are selected each year, based on a stratified sampling scheme.  The scheme tends to vary 
from year to year, but over the period under consideration establishments with more than 
100 employees were always sampled.  
In the data, an establishment is defined as the smallest unit that is deemed capable 
of providing information on the Census questionnaire.  Thus a ‘parent’ establishment 
reports for more than one plant (or ‘local unit’ in the parlance of ARD).  For selected multi-
                                                                                                                                                                                 
8 Hence, while the combined estimator still requires the assumption of “selection on observables”, DID purges 
all unobserved time invariant plant characteristics.   
9 One caveat of this estimator is that to the extent that there are positive (negative) wage spillovers from 
acquisition FDI to the control group of domestic establishments, the difference-in-differences procedure is 
likely to underestimate (overestimate) the causal effects of international takeovers on the wages of acquisition 
targets.     11
plant establishments, we only have aggregate values for the constituent plants.  Indicative 
information on the ‘children’ is available in the ‘non-selected’ file.  In the sample period 
considered in this paper over 95 percent of the establishment in both the electronics and 
food industries are single-plant firms.  In the actual sample we used for the econometric 
estimation this figure is around 80 percent for both sectors.  Thus most of the data we used 
is actually plant level data.  As a result we tend to use the terms plant and establishment 
interchangeably.  
In this paper we focus on two broad industries, namely electronics and food, rather 
than pooled data for the whole manufacturing industry.
10  In this way we avoid the potential 
problem of pooling plants that operate in very heterogeneous sectors and rather focus on 
relatively homogenous sets of plants within the two sectors.  We focus on these two 
particular industries for two reasons.  First, foreign-owned firms are important players in 
both sectors, accounting for about 19 percent of employment in electronics and 10 percent 
of employment in the food industry in 1996 (see Griffith and Simpson, 2003, Table 4).  
Second, we may expect the two sectors to be different in their technology usage, and hence, 
there may be differences in the determinants of foreign acquisition and its effects on skilled 
and unskilled wages.   
We define skilled and unskilled workers in terms of non-production and production 
workers, respectively, in line with the recent literature (e.g., Machin and van Reenen, 1998; 
Slaughter, 2000).  While this could be considered a rough measure of skills we can take 
some support for this classification from the previous literature.  Berman et al. (1994) show 
that the proportion of non-production workers matches quite closely over time with the 
proportion of white collar and more educated workers.  Also, Head and Ries (2002) show 
that non-production workers are on average more skilled than production workers.     12
In the ARD a consistently defined nationality indicator identifies whether an 
establishment is domestic or foreign owned.  Foreign acquisition is said to have occurred in 
year  t  when an establishment that has been in domestic hands up to year t-1 becomes a 
subsidiary of a foreign-based multinational and changes its nationality indicator.
11  Since 
the matching process described in the previous section requires data on the pre-acquisition 
period, we consider foreign take-overs that took place between 1981 and 1994.  Overall, 
there were 203 and 100 acquisitions in the electronics and food industries over that period, 
respectively, for which the necessary pre and post acquisition information is available.  
Table A1 in the appendix shows some summary statistics on the main variables 
used in the analysis, and the number of establishments in the data.  The panel used is 
unbalanced.  Table A2 shows the short run post-acquisition trajectories of employment for 
the two types of labour, and capital intensity in the acquired plants, by nationality of the 
acquirer.  As is notable, there are only few statistically significant changes.   
 
5 Testing the reliability of the propensity score matching method 
Balancing and sensitivity tests 
The propensity score matching method will provide a reliable and robust method for 
estimating the foreign acquisition effect if, conditional on the propensity score, the potential 
outcomes y
1 and y
0 are independent of the incidence of acquisition.  Under the assumption 
of independence conditional on observables, the pre-acquisition variables should be 
balanced between the acquired and non-acquired groups.  Lack of balance points to a 
possible mis-specification of the propensity score estimation.  Hence, as emphasised by 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
10 More precisely, using SIC 1980 classification, SIC 33 (manufacture of office machinery and data 
processing equipment), SIC 34 (electrical and electronic engineering), and SIC 41/42 (food, drink and 
tobacco). 
11 Establishments that appear to have experienced more than one change of ownership between 1980 and 1994 
are excluded from the analysis.  This is partly to avoid conflating the effects of different events, and partly 
because we suspect the presence of measurement error problems.   13
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and Dehejia and Wahba (2002) it is important to verify that 
this balancing condition is satisfied by the data.  In this paper we perform a number of 
balancing tests suggested in the recent literature (Dehejia, 2005, Smith and Todd, 2005b).  
The first balancing test examines the standardised difference (or bias) for all 
variables in X (that is the vector of covariates used in the propensity score estimation) as 
described in Smith and Todd (2005b).  For example, the standardised bias for the size 
variable is defined as the difference in means between the foreign acquired sample of firms 
(group A) and the appropriately matched comparison group of firms (group C) scaled by the 
average variances of the size variable in groups A and C.  Based on N acquired firm this is 
given as  
                   
2





size Var size Var
size p p g size
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 .                        (7) 
Note that the lower the standardised difference, the more balanced or similar the 
treatment and comparison groups will be in terms of the variable under consideration.   
Although there is no formal criterion as to how large a standardised bias should be for it to 
be considered serious, we follow Rosenbaum and Rubin (1985) and assume that a value of 
20 is large.  Furthermore, for each variable entering the propensity score model we perform 
a formal paired t-test between acquired and matched comparison to satisfy ourselves that no 
significant differences exist. 
Whereas the above balancing test calculates the cross-sample difference of each 
variable entering the probit model separately, there also exists a test that considers whether 
those differences can be taken as jointly insignificant.  This test is known as the Hotelling’s 
T-squared test and it has the flexibility of being based either on all observations or for 
separate segments of the sample defined by the propensity score estimates.  In this study we   14
divide the sample by propensity score quintile and conduct the Hotelling's T-squared test 
for each sub-sample.
12 
The third  balancing test we explore is suggested by Todd and Smith (2005b) and it 
is cast within a regression framework.  Let  ) ( ˆ X P  denote the estimated propensity score 
and let D be a dummy variable assuming a value of 1 if a plant is foreign acquired. Then for 
each variable included in the matching algorithm, the following regression function that is 
quartic in  ) ( ˆ X P  is estimated (again using the size variable as an example): 
                          ∑ ∑
= =











k X P D X P SIZE ε γ β β                                (8)  
and the joint significance of the coefficient on the terms involving the acquisition dummies 
(that is the γs) is tested.  As explained by Todd and Smith (2005b), if the propensity score 
satisfies the balancing condition, D should not provide any additional information and we 
should expect the γs to be jointly statistically insignificant.  
  Following the suggestion of Dehejia (2005), a fourth diagnostic that we undertake 
regarding the propensity score method is to check the sensitivity of the matching estimates 
to minor changes in the propensity score model.  If the results are not sensitive to such 
minor changes, the propensity score specification can be deemed robust and reliable.   
 
Evidence on balancing 
Table 1 reports the balancing test results based on Gaussian kernel matching.  The 
standardised differences between acquired and comparison sample are all less than 8% in 
                                                           
12 The extent of overlap between acquired and non-acquired plants on the propensity score is shown in Table 
A3 in the appendix. 
14 These are based on the Gaussian Kernel matching as discussed above.  We also considered the single 
nearest neighbour matching to check for robustness of our results to changes in the matching procedure.  The 
results are very similar to the ones obtained using Kernel matching.  Furthermore, we also compared our 
results with those obtained from a simple DID estimator.  See Table A4 in the appendix for some of these 
results.  Further results are not reported here to save space, but can be obtained from the authors.   15
the matched sample.  The substantial bias reduction as a result of adopting the matching 
method is also apparent from the figures in Table 1.  
The regression-based tests also corroborate the success of the propensity score-
matching approach adopted in this paper.  For all variables, we fail to reject the joint 
hypothesis that the γs are all equal to zero.  It is thus comforting that both standardised 
differences and regression tests are doing very well, suggesting that the propensity score 
specification we have chosen is effective in accounting for factors that determine selection 
into the treatment (i.e. foreign acquisition).  Table 2 summarises the results from the 
Hotelling test and reassuringly we find that the balancing conditions are satisfied within 
each propensity score quintile 
[Table 1 and Table 2 here] 
 
6 Difference-in-differences matching estimates  
Having established that conditional on the propensity score, the comparison and 
treatment group of firms are comparable, we now present in Table 3 the difference-in-
differences matching estimates.
14  These give the causal effects of foreign ownership on 
(log) skilled and unskilled wages, and hence the figures in this table can be interpreted as 
percentage changes in wages.  Throughout we impose the common support condition and 
confine our attention to the comparison group establishments that fall within the support of 
the propensity score distribution of the acquired plants.  
[Table 3 here] 
The top half of Table 3 reports the foreign acquisition impact estimates based on the 
preferred propensity score specification - that is the specification that passed the balancing 
tests as described above.  The post-acquisition period is given by t ranging from 1 (first 
year of foreign ownership) to 4.  The estimates show that the average causal effect of   16
foreign ownership on skilled wages is 2.6% in the first year of acquisition.  The estimates 
turn, however, statistically insignificant in later years, indicating that the accuracy of our 
estimator falls with t.  Interestingly, the impact on unskilled wages exhibits a different 
profile, with coefficients being statistically significant up to 3 years after the acquisition.  
The average impact is also higher compared with skilled wages: starting from 5.4% in the 
first year of acquisition and reaching 7.5% after three years.  However, it is worth noting 
that the level of skilled wages is more than 40% higher than unskilled wages (see Table 1).  
Nonetheless this finding suggests that there is no evidence that FDI exacerbates income 
inequality, as unskilled wages appear to change by more than the average skilled wage.  
The next step in the analysis is to check the sensitivity of the results by making a 
slight change to the propensity score specification suggested by Dehejia (2005).  Here we 
add a quadratic size term to the original list of covariates, and the impact estimates are 
given in the lower half of Table 3.
15  It is clear that these are comparable to the ones 
discussed above, both in magnitude and statistical significance.  This is further illustration 
of the appropriateness of propensity score specification. 
In search of industry specific effects 
The estimates reported in Table 3 are the average impact of the 303 foreign 
acquisitions, and as such may mask some interesting heterogeneity.  Here we ask whether 
the wage effects are the same in the two broad sectors under consideration: the skill-
intensive electronics sector in which 203 foreign takeovers are observed in our sample, and 
the low-tech food sector.  The estimates presented in Table 4 shed some light on the issue.  
It seems that in both sectors unskilled workers receive on average higher wages as a result 
of their plant’s newfound status as a subsidiary of a multinational company.  The absence 
of a robust statistically significant effect of foreign ownership on skilled wages within both 
                                                           
15 This specification also passed the balancing tests.  These are not reported here to save space.     17
sectors appears to be due to lower test power when dividing the observations into 
subsamples.  The results suggest that industry specific effects perhaps do not capture the 
underlying technology.  In the next subsection we explore whether the nationality of the 
foreign acquirer can shed more light on the issue. 
[Table 4 here] 
Are there country specific effects? 
As pointed out in Section 2, given the differences in technology and industrial 
relations institutions in different source countries, it is an interesting question to ask 
whether takeovers by multinationals from different countries have different effects on post-
acquisition wages.  In our data set we are able to distinguish three categories of 
nationalities, namely, US, EU and others.  Overall, slightly more acquisitions were carried 
out by US multinationals (108) than by firms from the two other nationality categories (EU: 
104, others: 91) over the time period analyzed.  The difference-in-differences matching 
estimates reported in Table 5 indeed reveal substantial differences across the nationality 
groups. 
[Table5 here] 
There is a robust and economically significant wage effect for both skilled and 
unskilled workers acquired by US multinationals.  For skilled workers, this takes effect a 
period after acquisition and stands at more than 8%.  The impact on unskilled wages is 
discernible at the period of acquisition and reaches nearly 13% after two years post-
acquisition.   In stark contrast, no evidence is found for any causal effect on wages, skilled 
or unskilled, following acquisition by EU based multinationals.  Finally we document 
positive unskilled wage effects the first two years (4.4% and 6.8%) following acquisition by 
multinationals from the rest of the world.     18
To sum up the difference-in-differences matching estimates indicate that there is 
substantial heterogeneity in the post acquisition effects on wages of acquisitions by firms 
from different home countries.  Hence, not taking account of this heterogeneity may miss 
out valuable information in the identification of the causal effect of foreign direct 
investment on wages.    
 
7 Conclusions 
This paper provides a systematic empirical analysis of wage differences between 
foreign multinationals and domestic firms.  In order to identify adequately the effect of 
foreign ownership we investigate the impact on wages of the takeover of a domestic 
establishment by foreign owners.  We pay particular attention to identifying the causal 
effect, using a difference-in-differences propensity score matching approach, and examine 
differences in post acquisition effects depending on the nationality of the acquirer.   
Our results suggest that there is substantial heterogeneity in the post-acquisition 
wage effect depending on the nationality of the foreign acquirer, the industry in which the 
firms operate and the skill group of workers.  In particular, we find that both skilled and 
unskilled workers, on average, experience a post acquisition increase in the wage rate 
following an acquisition by a US firm.  However, no such effects are discernable following 
acquisitions by EU firms.  The finding of substantial heterogeneity in the post acquisition 
effects suggests that studies that do not account for heterogeneity in worker types and 
nationality of ownership may be subject to considerable shortcomings.   
An interesting remaining question to ask is whether the observed post acquisition 
wage premium, in particular for US acquisitions, is something desirable.  This largely 
depends on the reason for the higher wage.  If, as we assume, the higher wage reflects the 
fact that the firm specific asset is utilized efficiently and/or that some of the rents are shared   19
between firm and workers, then this seems to be a desirable outcome.  If, however, wages 
are higher because “better” workers are employed after the takeover, then there does not 
appear to be any particularly positive effect, even more so if the workers were poached 
from domestic firms who have to reallocate labour internally as a result of the poaching.  A 
potential judgment about welfare implications becomes even more complicated if one takes 
into account the effects of a higher wage rate on domestic competitors, which may be 
priced out of the market.  In order to address this question a full theoretical analysis would 
be necessary, which should then be backed up by detailed micro evidence on characteristics 
of workers and firms.  This is a tall order that needs to be tackled in future research.   
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 Table 1:  




 Acquired  Control    %  bias 
 % bias 
reduction 






Skilled  wage  8.9442 8.9287 4.5  93.6  1.29   (0.198)  0.26 (0.9347) 
Unskilled  wage  8.5177 8.4923 6.5  85.1  1.91   (0.056)  0.38 (0.8643) 
Assisted area   0.36704  0.36612  0.2  98.9  0.06    (0.955)  0.40 (0.8479) 
Productivity  10.5  10.459  4.9  82.3  1.43    (0.153)  0.54 (0.7466) 
Size (capital)  15.361  15.152  6.9  78.7  1.84   (0.066)  0.20 (0.9630) 
Year  1987.6  1987.4  7.1  93.5  1.97     (0.049) 0.18 (0.9699) 
 
Definition of variables included in the matching: 
 
Skilled wage:    log of average wage per employee for non-production workers 
Unskilled wage:  log of average wage per employee for production workers 
Assisted area:   Dummy = 1 if plant located in area specially designated as “assisted” 
Productivity:     value added (total output – materials inputs) per employee 
Size:                 log capital stock 






Table 2:  







First  4.818  0.516  0.783 
Second  6.179  0.772  0.604 
Third  9.163  1.383  0.241 
Fourth  6.720  1.073  0.383 
Fifth  8.669  1.418  0.208   23
 
Table 3 : 
The impact of foreign acquisition on the log of skilled and unskilled wages 
 
  Skilled wage  Unskilled wage 









1 0.026  0.015** 0.054  0.017***
2 0.029  0.024  0.071  0.020***
3 0.030  0.023  0.075  0.028** 
4 0.046  0.031  0.049  0.032 
Modified  propensity score model 
1 0.037  0.022*  0.044  0.020** 
2 0.033  0.023  0.068  0.022***
3 0.061  0.050  0.071  0.030** 
4 0.031  0.058  0.036  0.032 
 
Notes: 
(i)  significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   






In search of industry-specific effects 
 










1 0.017  0.019  0.059  0.024** 
2 0.021  0.026  0.072  0.027***
3 0.016  0.040  0.082  0.031** 
4 0.029  0.035  0.042  0.042 
  Food sector 
1 0.036  0.034  0.037  0.019* 
2 0.020  0.038  0.048  0.026* 
3 0.010  0.043  0.058  0.120 
4 0.022  0.055  0.047  0.118 
 
Notes: 
(i)  significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
(ii)  Estimation is based on 203 [100] foreign acquisitions in the electronics [food] sector.  
   24
 
Table 5: 
Wage effects of acquisition FDI by country of origin 
 










1 0.036  0.024  0.085  0.041** 
2 0.083  0.038** 0.090  0.041** 
3 0.089  0.038** 0.129  0.059** 
4 0.092  0.047** 0.067  0.058 
  EU 
1 0.011  0.022  -0.003  0.021 
2 -0.016  0.020  0.030  0.027 
3 -0.017  0.039  0.039  0.040 
4 0.012  0.044  0.003  0.059 
OTHERS 
1 0.007  0.020  0.063  0.026** 
2 -0.012  0.044  0.072  0.030** 
3 -0.052  0.043  0.017  0.041 
4 -0.030  0.039  0.014  0.034 
 
Notes: 
(i)  significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
(ii)  Estimation is based on 108 USA, 104 EU and 91 others acquisitions.  
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Appendix  
                                                      
Table A1 










Log skilled labour  3.849 1.315 4.670 1.244 
Log unskilled labour  4.828 1.186 5.256 1.198 
Log skilled wage  8.811 0.350 8.933 0.313 
Log unskilled wage  8.433 0.382 8.532 0.348 
Log total output   15.606 1.406 16.308 1.338 
Log capital stock   14.976 2.789 15.456 2.471 
Log productivity  10.365 0.818 10.508 0.777 
Number of plants  3200   303  
Total observations  22722   2974  
Unbalanced panel  Yes   Yes  





Short run post-acquisition trajectories of labour and capital intensity 
 
  USA Acquisitions  EU Acquisitions Others  Acquisitions 




Skilled Unskilled    Skilled Unskilled    Skilled  Unskilled   
1  -0.109 -0.032 -0.500  -0.036 -0.006 0.317  0.048  -0.019 -0.661 
  (2.76)***  (0.58) (1.46)  (1.10) (0.12) (1.19)  (1.01)  (0.35) (1.13) 
2  -0.060 -0.034 -0.407  -0.075 0.051  0.485  0.046  -0.007 -0.703 
  (1.39) (0.67) (1.38)  (2.40)**  (1.09) (1.66)  (1.12)  (0.12) (1.50) 
3  -0.046 -0.056 -0.030  -0.090 0.079  0.032  -0.041  -0.092 -0.549 
  (1.39) (1.29) (0.11)  (2.53)**  (0.91) (0.11)  (1.02)  (2.07)**  (1.19) 
 
Notes: 
(i)  All regressions include year dummies 
(ii)  All variables are in log 
(iii)  Robust t statistics in parentheses 
(iv)   * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table A3: 
Frequency distribution of acquired and non-acquired 






First 42  698 
Second 16  761 
Third 27  633 
Fourth 60  560 
Fifth 158  548 





Table A4 : 
The impact of foreign acquisition on skilled  
and unskilled wages: Further results 
 
  Skilled wage  Unskilled wage 
Difference-in-differences combined with  









1 0.018  0.008** 0.065  0.017***
2 0.029  0.034  0.094  0.044***
3 0.051  0.043  0.081  0.044* 
4 0.016  0.055  0.016  0.052 
Simple difference-in-differences estimates 
1 0.007  0.014  0.041  0.019***
2 0.006  0.022  0.059  0.022***
3 -0.010  0.023  0.053  0.029* 
4 0.002  0.028  0.019  0.032 
Notes: 
(i)  Robust t statistics in parentheses 
(ii)   * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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